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ABSTRACT: Malaysian government planning and policymaking has increasingly come to 
recognise the role of women and the household in the promotion of a number of strategies 
aimed at enhancing economic competitiveness. Government planning documents 
emphasise the need to boost women’s labour market participation, increase women’s 
levels of entrepreneurship, and the need to strengthen and support the family unit —
developments that can been understood in terms of a market-building agenda in which 
women’s labour and the household are viewed as untapped resources in the struggle to 
maintain international competitiveness. This paper explores an important dimension of 
this policy turn: the role of civil society in both promoting and resisting this market 
building agenda. The paper focuses in particular on two case studies: religious NGOs 
involved in implementing ‘family strengthening’ programmes; and civil society 
engagements with the issue of women’s representation on corporate boards. 
 
Introduction 
The literature on the experience of civil society in Malaysia generally emphasises two 
features. First, the wide variety of civil society organisations and how these groups have 
sought to play a role in Malaysian politics, policy-making or processes of 
democratisation (Verma 2002; Abbott 2004; Derichs 2004; Weiss 2006). Second, the 
centrality of state soft/semi authoritarianism or ‘pseudo-democracy’ (Case 2004) in 
controlling and limiting the space within which civil society activity takes place 
(Browne 2004). In this literature, civil society groups are presented as tolerated by a 
state that also views them with suspicion and, at times, hostility. A host of legislation 
delineates and restricts civil society activity, and the state has consistently sought to 
deal coercively with forms of civil society activism that it perceives to be a threat. 
However, as Nair (2007a) argues, many of these writings tend to overemphasise the 
adversarial nature of state-civil society relations. After all, any account of civil society in 
Malaysia is complicated by the longstanding preoccupation with a politics of ethnicity 
whereby the ruling United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) led Barisan Nasional 
(BN) coalition has fostered the development of a viable and loyal yet politically passive 
Malay Muslim ethnic majority through instruments such as the New Economic Policy 
(NEP)1 (Nair 2007a). Into this mix is added the experience of economic development 
and modernisation based upon rapid industrialisation, the embrace of a particular 
vision of neoliberal modernity (Hilley 2001), and involving repressive forms of anti-
unionism that have discouraged the emergence of an oppositional civil society—
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especially one in which class-based interests prevail. It is a concern with the 
relationship(s) between civil society and economic transformation that informs this 
paper—a focus that is frequently sidelined in studies of civil society in Malaysia. In this 
regard, the characterisation of state-civil society relations emphasised in this paper has 
more in common with the Gramscian view of the Southeast Asian state as embedded in 
the relative interests and ideologies of civil society that has emerged in a range of 
studies (Hilley 2001; Ramasamy 2004; Sim 2006; Hedman 2006; Nair 2007a). 
The paper draws upon the example of government policies and programmes 
aimed at enhancing the contribution of women and the family to state development 
projects defined in terms of enhancing national economic ‘competitiveness’ and seeks to 
examine how civil society actors have responded to this agenda. I point to the role of 
civil society actors in legitimating state practices that act to (re)produce new market 
subjectivities that have become central to state-led processes of neoliberal market 
building. In particular how ‘wives’ and ‘mothers’ are viewed as playing important roles 
as productive market actors driving economic success and as custodians of those 
traditional family and religious values that remain centrally important in securing 
consent for an increasingly neoliberal state-led modernisation agenda.  
In order to understand the way in which a global policy consensus concerning 
women’s role in maintaining economic competitiveness has taken root in Malaysia, it is 
important to first point out that the desire to maintain and enhance the country’s 
competitiveness by building a knowledge-based economy has long been a hallmark of 
Malaysian economic policy making (Elias 2009). This focus was initially set out in 
former Prime Minister’s Mahathir Mohammed’s ‘Vision 2020’ (attaining developed 
country status by 2020) (Mahathir 1993). A focus that has been reconfirmed in the 
current Tenth Malaysia Plan (2011-2015) and other political-economic policy 
instruments such as the Economic Transformation Programme (ETP) focussed on the 
broad economic trajectory of the nation (particularly in terms of enhancing national 
economic competitiveness and the achievement of Vision 2020) that have been 
developed under the current Prime Ministership of Najib Tun Razak and overseen by 
the Performance Management and Delivery Unit (Permandu) established in 2009. A 
consensus around the need to promote economic competitiveness invariably reflects 
the significance that political leaders in the Asian region attach to this concept 
(especially in relation to national competitiveness benchmarking practices such as the 
World Economic Forum’s Competitiveness Index (Lall 2001: 1502)). More substantially, 
the pursuit of economic competitiveness by states in the Asian region can be linked to 
wider shifts in configurations of power and productive relations in ways that ‘prioritize 
private interests over social ones’ in forms of ‘new constitutional governance’ (Bakker 
and Gill 2008: 29). This can be related to what Cammack (2006) labels a global politics 
of competitiveness—that is, how the pursuit of national economic competitiveness 
reflect implicit assumptions concerning the need for the poor to engage, as productive 
actors, in the market economy in ways that consistently privilege the interests of capital 
over labour. Thus ‘competitiveness’ is sustained through (a) policies focussed on 
corporate governance reform and privatisation that reassert the power of capital (and 
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financial capital in particular); and (b) practices of ‘systematic proletarianisation’ 
(Cammack 2004: 206) in which poor and marginalised groups are brought more 
thoroughly into the functioning of the market economy as commodified wage labour—
hence competitiveness promotion is reflected in a widening and deepening of the 
market economy into traditionally ‘non-market’ spaces (such as the household). 
Of course, the promotion and expansion of new markets and marketized spaces 
in the manner described by Cammack above is, in certain respects a state-led process 
(motivated, in part by states’ desires to climb international competitiveness rankings—
see Fougner 2008; Scheuth 2010). Nevins and Peluso (2009), for example, highlight the 
centrality of the (Polanyian) state in the everyday politics of market-building in the 
Southeast Asian region. But as Carroll(2012) has argued, market-building agendas are 
also intricately linked to shifts in the neoliberal reform agendas of the international 
development industry (and the World Bank in particular) that serve to promote market-
building initiatives that frequently work around or even preclude state-institutions. 
Despite the fact that the involvement of international financial institutions in Malaysia is 
rather minimal, it is important to acknowledge the ways in which processes of market-
building reflect broader transformations in the practices of neoliberal reform. 
A central theoretical assumption guiding the analysis presented in this paper is 
that a (materialist) feminist analysis provides important insights into understanding the 
dynamics of state-civil society relations in relation to broader transformations in 
patterns of productive-socially reproductive relations (Bakker and Gills 2003). The 
concept of social relations of reproduction is employed in this paper in the feminist 
sense to refer to the kinds of deeply feminised household and care related activities (or 
‘the fleshy, messy and indeterminate stuff of everyday life’ (Katz 2001: 711)) so central 
to the functioning of the productive economy, and yet, generally unaccounted for in 
conventional economic analysis. Feminist insights can also be utilised in challenging 
assumptions about civil society that present it not only as an autonomous realm of 
politics but as part of a genderless public sphere separate from the everyday politics 
and practices of the family, the household and the state itself. As Howell (2005) notes, a 
feminist perspective points, instead, to the permeability of the boundaries that exist 
between the thoroughly gendered terrains of state, market, civil society and household. 
But it is perhaps even more useful to understand state-civil society interactions in 
relation to Connell’s conception of the ‘gender order’ (Connell 1987)—that is, how state 
power is central to the regulation and shaping of localised gender regimes based on 
specific productive-reproductive configurations (Connell 1990), how these regimes 
exist alongside structures of race and ethnicity (Hall 1986) and, how they are being 
transformed through engagements with a transnational disciplinary neoliberalism 
(Bakker and Gills 2003). Accordingly, the state should not be viewed as a homogenous 
entity, but as one in which there are conflicting and contradictory interests – hence 
state activities can act to both consolidate and unsettle the existing gender order. 
Significantly, internal divisions and conflicting agendas within the state open up spaces 
for specific forms of state-civil society interaction—two examples of which are the focus 
of this paper. 
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By focussing on two specific policy issues (family strengthening programmes and 
policies aimed at increasing women’s representation on corporate boards through an 
unofficial ‘quota’ system), I aim to demonstrate that civil society actors have been 
complicit in the promotion of state gender policies that are framed by the desire to build 
competitive economic growth. Attempts to incorporate gender issues into development 
policy through a focus on increasing women’s engagement in the productive economy 
exist in uneasy alliance with a more traditionalist focus on women’s roles as wives and 
mothers. Thus not only women, but the family itself (as a site for the (re)production of 
good market-citizens) are seen as drivers of competitive economic growth. These two 
strands of government policy making are reflected in state-civil society engagements. 
Taking the first example, that of civil society engagements with family policy, an 
important component of Malaysia’s drive for economic competitiveness are attempts to 
reconcile economic ‘modernisation’ with the increased Islamicisation of state and 
society. Within this context Malay Muslim women come to play important symbolic 
roles in debates over the appropriate role and position of women in society – with the 
image of the modern Malay woman presented in relation not only to her engagement in 
the productive economy, but in terms of her commitments to traditional family roles 
and personal religious piety. Hence religious NGOs engage in family strengthening 
programmes that act to particular ‘traditionalist’ understandings of gender roles within 
the family (albeit a traditionalism that is mediated by the realities of women’s increased 
economic roles outside of the home). Civil society engagement with state family policy 
agendas is thus shown to support the uneasy ways in which religion has been linked to 
state modernisation projects. The second example, of women’s representation on 
corporate boards, is a case in which a more progressivist agenda broadly supported by 
the feminist oriented activist women’s movement has gained traction in policy-making 
circles. However, this issue needs to be related to how the Malaysian state has sought 
consistently to curtail and constrain the spaces and opportunities for engagement with 
an activist civil society. Despite the existence of a vibrant activist women’s movement in 
Malaysia, this issue gained support mainly because of the involvement of civil society 
actors representing the corporate sector—thus pointing to the fact that the pursuit of 
women’s empowerment agendas is most successful when it engages the support of 
powerful and influential (corporate and neoliberal compatible) interests within both 
the state and civil society.  
This paper is structured into three main sections. The first of these briefly 
outlines the way in which gender issues in Malaysia have been framed in terms of a 
need to build national economic competitiveness. Part two moves on to examine how 
notions of national economic competitiveness are linked to a broader moral agenda 
concerning the role of the family and points to the role that NGOs and an Islamicised 
civil society more generally have played in terms of the implementation of this agenda. 
By emphasising the role of religious organisations in delivering state programmes 
associated with the need to strengthen the family as an important component of 
economic development, I draw attention to the very culturally specific modes through 
which processes related to the widening and deepening of the market economy take 
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place. The third part of the paper then turns to look at the interesting configuration of 
civil society and state interests that have coalesced around the issue of women’s 
representation on corporate boards. I begin this discussion with a look at the politics of 
the Malaysian women’s movement and its embrace of ‘market feminism’. The 
government’s promotion of the issue of women’s representation on corporate boards, 
can be represented as a market-feminist success story. However, it is a success story in 
which the voices of powerful corporate-linked interests predominate and the message 
of feminism has been subordinated to the market. The research draws upon interviews 
undertaken with state officials and civil society groups over the course of three research 
trips to Malaysia (in 2010, 2011 and 2012). The research also draws upon analysis of 
relevant publically available government documents (in particular economic planning 
documents), and analysis of a range of secondary source materials such as news media 
and NGO-linked websites.  
 
Mobilising women to serve the competitiveness agenda 
 
A notable emphasis in Malaysian government policy documents and pronouncements 
on the knowledge economy is a deeply instrumentalist focus on women’s role in 
sustaining national competitiveness through their participation in the productive 
economy. For example, in the Tenth Malaysia Plan the claim is made that ‘it is essential 
that women are given the right opportunities, environment and mindset so that they 
can participate and contribute in the various fields of national development’ (Malaysia 
2010: 180). Such claims can be related more broadly to the emphasis in the Tenth Plan 
on the role of ‘human capital’ and ‘talent’, or more specifically, knowledgeable and 
innovative citizens with a ‘first class mentality’ (Malaysia 2010: 46) in raising 
productivity and competitiveness. Despite the dominance of female employment in the 
economically important export manufacturing sectors of the economy, the overall 
female labour force participation rate in Malaysia has remained low. This is of concern 
to policy makers with the Tenth Plan drawing attention to the fact that although the 
country’s female labour force participation rate rose from 44.7 per cent in 1995 to 45.7 
per cent in 2008 to 46.4 per cent in 2009 (a figure that can be contrasted with a male 
labour force participation rate of around 80 per cent), Malaysia has considerably lower 
female labour force participation rates in comparison to regional neighbours such as 
Thailand (70.0 per cent), Singapore (60.2 per cent) and Indonesia (51.8 per cent) 
(Malaysia 2010: 178). The desire to increase women’s labour force participation has 
frequently been presented as a way of lessening the economy’s dependence on migrant 
labour and concerns are raised over the fact that many highly skilled and educated 
women leave the workforce once they start to have children (Loh-Ludher, 2009). In the 
Tenth Plan the issue of increasing women’s labour force participation is discussed in 
terms of increasing the opportunities for women to work through better provision of 
childcare services in the community and the need to further expand the already highly 
visible group of women ‘decision makers’ in the public sector to 30 per cent (Malaysia 
2010). Under the ETP, a Human Capital Strategic Reform Initiative (SRI) Lab was 
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established and made recommendations regarding the need to ‘leverage on women’s 
talent to increase productivity’ that included expanding childcare provision (Permandu 
2011: 235)2. 
Another important strand of government gender and development policy making 
concerns women’s role in alleviating socio-economic inequality via microenterprise 
development—with a stated aim of creating 4000 women entrepreneurs by 2012 
(Malaysia 2010: 178). Microenterprise development schemes for women are similar to 
the parallel attempts to increase women’s labour force participation in that they seek to 
further propel women into the market economy. Whereas there is a recognition that 
(middle class, urban) women’s labour force participation in the knowledge-economy 
depends on making available flexible work arrangements and childcare services, 
microenterprise is conceptualised as fostering ‘inclusive socio-economic development’ 
(Malaysia 2010: 139) by drawing marginalised women into the market economy and, 
because most microenterprises are home-based, enabling them to combine paid work 
with their socially reproductive responsibilities. Both strategies depend, nonetheless on 
a conceptualisation of women’s labour as an unproductive resource whose capacities 
can be better utilised in the country’s pursuit of economic competitiveness. 
The rhetorical commitment of the Malaysian state to increasing women’s labour 
force participation is, in practice, significantly constrained by a failure to support 
women’s socially reproductive roles. For example, commitments to increasing the 
availability of childcare for the under-4s have depended largely on (deeply 
unsuccessful) inducements to the private sector to establish workplace crèches (Elias 
2011). Women’s labour market participation is supported by a patchwork of privatised 
socially reproductive arrangements such as the employment of migrant domestic 
workers, childcare services where they are available—frequently in centres that are 
unregistered and fail to meet adequate government standards such as staff-child ratios 
and heath and safety standards, as well as an increased reliance on informal and 
extended family support networks. The ‘intensification of exploitation’ is thus 
accompanied by a ‘depletion of social resources’ (Rai, Hoskyns and Thomas 2012) that 
government policies have sought to address via policies of ‘family strengthening’ (see 
below) rather than through efforts to better address society’s socially reproductive 
welfare needs. 
 
Family policy and the moral imperative of development 
 
Policies aimed at bolstering women’s productive economic activities (as workers and 
microentrepreneurs) also need to be situated alongside the long standing policy 
emphasis on women’s socially reproductive roles—both in terms of population policies 
(efforts to increase the birth rate—Thambiah 2010) and in relation to perceptions 
regarding the central role that women perform in strengthening the family—
perceptions that invariably intersect with deeply nationalistic and racialised agendas 
especially within the Malay community. The family, and the household more generally, 
comes to be presented as a key site for the (re)production of economically productive 
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and suitably nationalistic and loyal Malaysians. As Prime Minister Najib argued at the 
launch of the Tenth Plan: 
 
As the saying goes, the hand that rocks the cradle rules the world. The status of 
women in society is a good indicator of a progressive and dynamic country. 
Women are the cornerstone of happy families and the essence of a successful 
nation (2010: 46). 
 
Women’s increased labour force participation is presented in government planning 
documents as an economic necessity but concerns have been raised that women will 
neglect their role in the social reproduction of labour (fears that are compounded by the 
increased reliance on foreign domestic workers). Claiming that ‘[f]amilies are the 
cornerstone of a healthy, dynamic and productive nation’ (Malaysia 2010: 186), the 
Tenth Plan highlights the need for ‘[p]rogrammes that instil character building and 
family values’ that will focus on ‘strengthening marriage and promoting equitable 
sharing of resources, responsibilities and tasks’ (Malaysia 2010: 187). These include 
schemes such as the National Population and Family Development Board (LPPKN)-run 
pre-marriage guidance programme SMARTSTART (which is tailored to suit the 
particular religious needs of different ethnic groups) and the Parenting@work 
programme designed to support young parents. In his forward to the SMARTSTART 
book (distributed to all course participants), former prime minister Abdullah Badawi 
overtly links these programmes to national economic success, embracing a 
modernisation script in which morally upstanding and economically engaged citizens 
are nurtured within (and not constrained by) family settings in which commitments to 
‘tradition’ and religious values are maintained. Hence: 
 
The marriage institution is the core to the forming of a family in Malaysia. The 
strengthening of the family from the early stages of its formation can provide a 
strong and solid foundation for the development of human capital among the 
younger generation. Human capital is critical to the well-balanced development of 
the nation. To enhance the current stage of our country’s modernization and the 
progress that we have achieved, we need to empower and develop human capital 
that has a first class mentality with a heart for progress. These individuals could 
then safeguard and manage the great developments that our country has achieved 
through good leadership and management (Abdullah 2006: 3). 
 
In what follows I look at the context within which the LPPKN’s work on strengthening 
the family has emerged before turning to consider the nature of the agency’s 
engagement with NGOs. The LPPKN is an agency that is housed within the Ministry of 
Women, Family and Community Development. The agency presents the work that it 
does in terms of the gender-neutral language of shared and equitable parenting. Indeed, 
the agency’s work in this area is noted in the Malaysian government’s appearance at a 
2006 CEDAW meeting at the UN in New York (CEDAW 2006). But, despite these 
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rhetorical commitments to gender equality within the family, the LPPKN’s work reflects 
a deeply conservative agenda that needs to be situated within the wider Islamicisation 
of state and society in Malaysia (Stivens 2006). Much of the work that the LPPKN is 
involved in is presented in terms of ideas concerning the moral threat(s) posed by the 
emergence of new family forms that have arisen in the wake of economic development 
and urbanisation. Take as an example this quotation from a former LPPKN Director 
General. 
 
The most likely family scenario in the coming decades is small nuclear families 
with high levels of economic activity of both husbands and wives. This is clearly a 
very different family from the traditional Malaysian family, and care will need to 
be taken to ensure that family values are not sacrificed on the alter of economic 
gains, both at the national and individual levels (Fatimah 2007, p. 184). 
 
It should be noted however, that the image of Malaysia as transitioning in a 
straightforward manner towards small nuclear families, belies the extent to which a 
greater plurality of family forms exists in Malaysia. Not least of which is the significance 
of single headed (usually female) households which experience disproportionately high 
levels of poverty (Evans 2011). But such a story does not fit within a moral agenda that 
presents the heteronormative family unit as a transitioning yet essential component of 
development success.  
Commitments to the family and family values are operationalised in order to 
present economic development as possessing a moral dimension. For example, 
Mahathir’s Vision 2020 speech included nine ‘strategic challenges’ of which the fourth 
was ‘to establish a fully moral and ethical society whose citizens are strong in religious 
and spiritual values and imbued with the highest ethical standards’ (Mahathir 1993). A 
seventh challenge was that ‘of establishing a fully caring society and a caring culture, a 
social system in which society will come before self, in which the welfare of the people 
will revolve not around the state or the individual but around a strong and resilient 
family system’ (Mahathir 1993). Thus exposing the way in which moral commitments to 
family values also serve an important political-economic agenda in which welfare state 
provisioning is to be kept at very minimal levels.  
 
Civil society engagements with state family-policy agendas: The SMARTSTART 
programme 
 
The conceptualisation of the strong/traditional family as being threatened by forces of 
modernisation and secularisation continues to inform the LPPKN’s work. Thus the 
LPPKN chairman stated provocatively in 2010 that ‘the family is under attack’ and the 
deputy LPPKN director general suggested that ‘in developing the future human capital 
needs of our country, we start from the family. But if that very basis is weak, what will 
happen to the community and country?’ (Koshy 2010). In recent years issues of 
declining family values continually re-emerge in the form of various moral panics 
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around issues such as juvenile delinquency, rising divorce rates, the role of migrant 
domestic workers in raising children, the rise of ‘commuter families’ (families in which 
both parents have to travel long distances to work) and teen pregnancy/abandoning of 
babies by unwed mothers.3 For the religious organisations engaged with LPPKN 
programmes, it is precisely these moral issues that need to be addressed through family 
strengthening activities. Programmes such as SMARTSTART place significant emphasis 
on the importance of religious values in maintaining healthy and harmonious marriages 
and family life and faith based organisations dominate in the delivery of the 
programme. The SMARTSTART book reiterates the aforementioned concerns about 
how ‘modern’ living challenges traditional family values. Hence: ‘We live in a touch ‘n’ 
go era. People want to be free to move about, change jobs, change beliefs even… But 
marriage is meant to be permanent’ (LPPKN 2006: 9). Religious values are presented as 
central to addressing this problem: 
 
Families are breaking down and children are leaving the traditional values we 
grew up with. One of the most important things we can do to preserve our 
marriages is to follow the guidance of our religious teachings about the home. 
Whether you are Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu or Christian, if you follow the values 
taught, it will help foster a much happier home (LPPKN 2006: 15). 
 
There are numerous religious NGOs that are involved in administering the 
SMARTSTART programme. These include Christian groups such as Focus on the Family 
(a US-linked, right-wing Christian organisation) and Calvary Life Ministries (who also 
runs programmes for people who wish to ‘recover’ from ‘same gender attraction’). 
Islamic groups administering the programme include ABIM (the Islamic youth 
movement established in the 1980s), Wanita ISMA (the women’s wing of a nationwide 
Islamic social affairs organisation Ikatan Muslimin Malaysia), the Sarawak based Islamic 
Information Centre and Pusat Islam UTHM (based in the southern state of Johore)4. 
Although it was not possible to gain access to many of the groups engaged in 
administering this programme, interviews conducted at Wanita ISMA provide some 
interesting insights.5 This is an organisation that is focussed mainly on educational and 
family issues and saw the SMARTSTART programme as fitting well within its existing 
family-focussed activities. These activities include religious educational programmes for 
members’ children, already existing counselling programmes for married couples, a 
family conference (held in 2011) and a women’s conference (in 2010) in which 
speakers sought to emphasise the importance of religious values in strengthening 
families. The organisation adopts an approach to social issues in which the fostering of 
religious values and moral codes within families are viewed as central to the prevention 
of wider social ills. The emphasis is on personal piety and religious devotion rather than 
broader structural and political change (thus the ‘solution’ to the problem of abandoned 
babies lies in better religious education and observance amongst the young). Issues 
surrounding the rise in divorce amongst the Malay population are viewed as an 
important area of concern that can be addressed through better adherence to religious 
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teachings (in the manner suggested in the SMARTSTART book quoted above). Thus the 
SMARTSTART programme (which it has been offering for the last two years in four 
different states) was generally offered by this organisation to already married couples 
—those in the 2-5 year ‘danger zone’ for divorce.6 The organisation echoes the LPPKN’s 
conception of the family as a form of two parent nuclear family facing the challenges of 
modern society in its work. Thus family educational programmes are strongly focussed 
on the role of responsible fatherhood (the father as leader of the household strongly 
involved in the practical and religious upbringing of children). Family programmes are 
viewed as supporting particular forms of tolerant, family-focussed responsible 
masculinity understood in terms of ‘service to our country, ourselves and our religion 
also’7. Women are viewed as assuming responsibility for the day to day management of 
the household—a perspective that was viewed by the interviewees as in-line with 
Islamic teachings on the family. 
Whilst the values of the religious organisations involved in SMARTSTART stem 
from traditionalist religious sources, it should be noted that many of these religious 
organisations and NGOs are themselves frequently a product of Malaysia’s political-
economic transformation. Islamic groups in particular should not in any sense be 
regarded as autonomous civil society actors (in a neo-Tocquevillian sense) given the 
extent to which Islam has come to be institutionalised within the practices of the 
Malaysian state. Whilst we need to be attendant to the fact that there exist multiple and 
conflicting forms of Islamic women’s movements, what is interesting to note is the way 
in which across the spectrum of organisations involved in Islamic issues, women are 
viewed as playing important roles in the arenas of the workplace, social activism the 
household and religious practice (Maznah 2006). This is not to deny the fact that 
processes of Islamiciation in Malaysia have had rather contradictory consequences—on 
the one hand propelling a number of women into significant political roles and on the 
other hand sanctioning the reinterpretation of Islamic family law and practice in highly 
gender discriminatory ways. Within Wanita ISMA, a vision of family-life and domestic 
arrangements was put forward that sought to present Islamic teachings on the family in 
terms of the realities of family life amongst the urban Malay middle classes. Importantly, 
women are not viewed solely as housewives/stay at home mothers but modern Islamic 
motherhood is conceptualised in terms of how women seek to find a balance between 
their working and their domestic lives. Hence ‘besides the fact that we are busy with our 
careers and our activism and so on, we don’t want to leave our children behind’.8 This in 
large part stems from the highly educated, middle class and professional status of these 
women activists many of whom are able to employ foreign domestic workers to support 
their multiple roles as activists, workers, entrepreneurs and students as well as their 
family responsibilities. The social activism that Islamic women at Wanita ISMA engage 
in should not be conceptualised as feminism (indeed, they view feminist agendas as 
morally corrupt), rather, this is a form of activism that seeks to reconcile changes in the 
economic status of women outside of the home with commitments to religious and 
family values. This, then, is a ‘new’ traditionalism thoroughly compatible with 
constructions of women as good market-citizens engaged in both the productive 
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economy and the social reproduction of a generation of morally upstanding and 
economically engaged Malaysians, and supported by the expansion of the market for (a 
racialised underclass) of migrant domestic workers. 
 
Market feminism and the Malaysian women’s movement 
 
As the previous discussion reveals, the existence of ‘traditionalist’ discourses 
concerning how families are ‘under threat’ and the need to bolster family values is 
employed by civil society groups in ways that seek to reconcile more conservative 
values with women’s widespread engagement in the productive economy. These 
processes of reconciliation can be related to the way in which government gender and 
development policy-making has been framed around ideas of gender equality being 
attained through market-based freedoms. Thus the kinds of arguments and issues that 
many more feminist-oriented women’s movements have advocated for have gained 
greater mass appeal not because of processes of political mobilisation within the 
women’s movement, but because ‘[t]he message of feminism can also be subjected to 
the logic of the free market’ (Ng, Maznah and hui 2006:38). Furthermore, ‘freedom 
engendered by the market—and one complemented by a mass-consumer culture—
works to depoliticise many of the issues related to reforms and reinforce political 
apathy in society’ (Ng, Maznah and hui 2006:38). In what follows I seek to illustrate 
these concerns by drawing upon the example of civil society involvement in campaigns 
for women’s representation on corporate boards. I initially contextualise this issue by 
focussing on the broad patterns of women’s politically engaged and more feminist 
oriented activism in Malaysia, before turning to explore the intersections between 
market feminism and corporate gender initiatives. 
Women’s civil society activism in Malaysia not only has a very long history but is 
made up of a plethora of different organisations with competing political ideologies. 
There is not space in this paper to provide a comprehensive overview of the Malaysian 
women’s movement although commentators have pointed to the divide that exists 
between organisations that position themselves more as social service providers and 
those avowedly feminist and activist oriented groups that adopt a more antagonistic 
position against the state (Ng Maznah and hui 2006). One way of illustrating this divide 
is to point to the two main umbrella/coalitional groupings within the Malaysian 
women’s movement—the National Council of Women’s Organisations (the official 
umbrella body for women’s NGOs) and the JAG (Joint Action Group for Gender Equality) 
coalition of activist women’s NGOs (made up of the NGOs Empower, All Women’s Action 
Society (AWAM), Women’s Centre for Change (WCC) Sisters in Islam (SIS) and Women’s 
Aid Organisation (WAO)). An important characteristic of the second group is their 
adoption of transnational feminist framing strategies—witnessed most obviously in 
terms of an engagement with the CEDAW process and the language of women’s rights, 
especially in relation to the issue of violence against women (VAW). JAG members have 
also been involved in campaigns to protect the rights of migrant domestic workers, the 
group Empower has been strongly involved in campaigning on issues relating to 
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women’s political and economic empowerment9 and the well known Muslim feminist 
group Sisters in Islam has campaigned on issues relating to the rise of socially 
conservative Islamic agendas in areas such as family law (Nair 2007b).10 The politically 
active women’s movement in Malaysia also includes other groups such as the Penang-
based 3G’s (Good Governance and Gender Equality Society) that has pursued issues 
relating to gender mainstreaming and women’s empowerment and organisations such 
as the pro-migrant worker group Tenaganita who, although not exclusively focussed on 
women’s issues, have spearheaded numerous campaigns around the issue of migrant 
domestic worker employment in Malaysia.  
Nonetheless, activist women’s groups in Malaysia have all too frequently adopted 
a form of feminism that is deeply uncritical of state gender policies framed in terms of 
the linkages between women’s economic empowerment and broader national economic 
goals such as boosting competitiveness. In part, this lack of criticism stems from the 
(correct) perception that government policies designed to enhance the status of women 
are continually hindered by both a lack of commitment to gender mainstreaming 
processes within the state and more traditionalist social forces (both inside and outside 
of the state). Thus women’s groups have been critical of the way in which gender policy-
machineries such as the cabinet level committee on gender equality have been 
downgraded, core feminist concerns such as the need for anti-sexual harassment 
legislation has been persistently sidelined (Ho 2011) and the ways in which an 
increasingly politicised Islam has been employed to undermine Muslim women’s legal 
rights and to shore-up patriarchal privileges. Thus any government policies that are 
seen as pro-women are regarded in a positive light.  
Another important consideration is that the dominance of a market feminist 
perspective reflects wider global shifts in feminism whereby an instrumentalist 
‘business case’ approach to gender equality has become the dominant global discourse 
through which gender equality claims are articulated. The problem is that the logic of 
such a perspective is to present gender equality claims as only valid if they fit within a 
market logic. One of the features of market feminism is that it results in agendas that 
serve more the interests of economically powerful and elite groups of women rather 
than the interests of those further down the economic scale. Whilst I would not want to 
suggest that there are intrinsic problems with policies aiming to increase women’s 
labour market participation and the representation of women in decision making roles 
—these policies need to be subjected to greater scrutiny. For example, questions need 
to be asked about the extent to which these strategies rest upon the continued 
expansion of the market for migrant domestic workers in light of continued 
inadequacies in childcare provision and continuing assumptions about women’s 
domestic responsibilities (Jones 2012: 267-8).  
 




I now turn to explore the recent ‘success story’ of the decision to implement a gender 
quota on the boards of publically listed Malaysian companies. This is an important issue 
because it actually represents one of the few examples of government success on a 
flagship/high profile gender and development strategy. The then Minister for Women, 
Family and Community Development announced in 2011 that the government would be 
putting in place a ‘quota’ of 30 per cent female representation on corporate boards by 
2016. The quota was in fact more like a target since companies would not be penalised 
for failure to comply with the policy. Nonetheless, in July 2011 the head of the Malaysian 
Securities Commission, Zarinah Anwar, launched its Corporate Governance Blueprint 
2011 which stated that Bursa Malaysia listed companies will be required to disclose in 
their annual report policies and targets for women’s representation on the board (Tee 
and Lee 2011; Securities Commission of Malaysia 2011: 36). The target was compared 
with the target of 30 per cent of women in decision making roles that had been 
announced for the public sector in the Ninth Malaysia Plan and was attained during the 
Tenth Plan Period. The policy target of 30 per cent women’s representation on 
corporate boards would be complemented by the development of a register of potential 
female corporate directors and training for potential directors. This training, it was 
hoped, would also function to highlight to senior business women the need for them to 
act as mentors and champions for women in their workplace. The aim of such policies 
then is not only to enable more women to break through the corporate glass ceiling, but 
also to lead to a shift in those gendered boardroom cultures or ‘old boys networks’ that 
have persistently excluded women.11 More generally, this policy needs to be understood 
within the context of efforts to increase women’s labour force participation. Concerns 
have been raised that the existence of lack of adequate opportunities for women in 
highly paying jobs is a major factor in the decision by many educated women to leave 
the labour force, the 30 per cent target for women on corporate boards is thus 
perceived as sending an important signal regarding the need for the corporate sector to 
increase opportunities for women in senior positions (Permandu 2011: 235). 
In a radio interview, following the announcement, a UNDP Malaysia official 
engaged in gender and development work argued that the ‘quota’ reflected the 
government taking seriously the voices of women and of activist women in particular 
who had advocated on this issue (YouTube/undpmalaysia: 2011). But who exactly were 
the civil society actors who were involved in pushing for and developing this policy 
issue? Interestingly, it appears that women’s NGOs played a rather minimal role—
politically engaged women’s groups had certainly raised issues relating to women’s 
empowerment and the lack of women’s representation in corporate decision making, 
but the policy came about because of a particular alignment of powerful corporate and 
state feminist interests. One of the most important players in pushing this issue has 
been the Non-Aligned Movement Institute for Women’s Empowerment (NIEW) an 
agency that falls within the Ministry for Women Family and Community Development. 
Established in 2006 and currently headed by Rafiah Salim, the former Vice Chancellor of 
the University of Malaya. NIEW acts as a think tank pushing gender related research and 
policy ideas. These efforts were supported by other prominent women including the 
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head of the central bank (Bank Negara) and the head of the Securities Commission. 
Rafiah’s credibility as a key proponent (or policy entrepreneur) of this issue was 
enhanced not only by her very close ties to many of the key corporate bodies involved in 
this issue (for example, before heading NIEW Rafiah was the head of the Bank Negara 
funded International Centre for Leadership and Governance (Iclif) which promotes 
corporate governance through senior executive training) but also by the fact that she 
herself sits on several corporate boards and has experience of senior executive 
management during a stint as the director of Human Resources at one of Malaysia’s 
largest private sector banks, Maybank.  
Several actors more clearly associated with civil society have played an 
important role in promoting this issue—these groups are associated with the corporate 
sector rather than from the women’s movement. They included The Malaysian Minority 
Shareholders Watchdog Group (whose female CEO has played a prominent role in 
championing the issue12), the Malaysian Alliance of Corporate Directors, the National 
Association of Women Entrepreneurs of Malaysia and prominent Malaysian business 
women (Tee and Lee 2011; The Star online 2011). What can be observed, then, is how a 
particular political opportunity structure enabled the emergence of the gender 
representation on corporate board policy. Given this configuration of interests, the issue 
of women’s representation on corporate boards tends to be presented as a ‘business 
case’ linked to the view that the presence of women on boards improves profitability 
and has a positive impact on corporate governance. Thus women’s presence 
undermines ‘groupthink’, and decreases a propensity towards unnecessary risk-
taking13. It is an agenda that also, it might be noted, sits very well alongside the strong 
emphasis on corporate governance reform that has accompanied the institutionalist 
turn in neoliberal development policy-making since the Asian crisis.  
Within a country such as Malaysia where activist women’s groups are 
consistently criticised for engagement in political issues, and are largely excluded from 
involvement in policies that impact on women (especially in areas such as women’s 
rights in Islam), the corporate board policy represented a rare success. One of the few 
critical commentaries on the issue came from a representative of the Penang based 3Gs 
network who argued on his blog that ‘[b]y forcing the private sector to adopt 30 per 
cent women quota without first addressing the problems in existing Government policy 
and structure, the Prime Minister is privatizing the Government’s duty towards gender 
equality!’ (Sim 2011). Elsewhere, the women’s group Empower pointed out that 
government efforts focussed on training and preparing women to sit on boards needed 
to be set against the lack of government support for low income earners such as women 
in the informal sector. Commenting on the issue of women’s representation on 
corporate boards in its 2010/11 Malaysian Women Human Rights Report Empower 
suggested that ‘the ministry [of Women, Family and Community Development] should 
focus more attention on women’s participation in the informal sectors and those 
working in low-wage. Low-skill industries as this group tends to be less visible but more 
needy’ (Chin binti Abdullah 2012: 57). 
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The issues of women’s representation in politics and gendered structures of 
poverty are certainly much more challenging issues than women’s representation on 
corporate boards. Many activist women’s groups have consistently sought to highlight 
these more complex issues. For example a Women’s Candidacy Initiative (WCI) emerged 
out of the reformasi movement at the 1999 general election and at the 2008 election the 
WCI ran the ‘Mak Bedah’ campaign to promote women’s issues14 and women’s groups 
have since the 1990s presented their demands around a Women’s Agenda for Change 
that incorporates commitments to improving the socio-economic status of all Malaysian 
women. Similarly, in 2012, a women-focussed clean government campaign, Wanita 
Suara Perubahan, was formed by the NGO Empower and led protests in March of that 
year not only around issues of corruption and government accountability, but also 
focussing on issues such as the need for a living wage, the impacts of privatisation and 
violence against women15. But such initiatives need to be set within the wider realities 
of both the state’s limited engagements with activist women’s groups and the global 
corporatisation of gender issues—the increased voice of the private sector in issues of 
gender equality. On a global scale we can point to the plethora of corporate-led gender 
initiatives such as the WEF’s global gender gap reports, the Global Compact gender 
empowerment principle’s and Nike’s discovery of the ‘girl effect’. In the Malaysian 
context, we need to be attendant to the way in which a corporatised gender agenda has 
taken shape in ways that clearly privilege the experiences and concerns of elite women. 
The success of the women on corporate boards agenda was a result of (a) the existence 
of a powerful and tight-knit configuration of interests centred on particular elite women 
inside and outside of the state and, (b) the ability to present this issue not only as 
gender equality measure but as a corporate governance issue—thereby securing wider 




Rodan and Hughes’ (2012) work on social accountability activism in Southeast Asia 
points to the salience within civil society of liberal and moral agendas that act to 
undermine the initial democratic impulses of these movements in ways that support 
existing (neoliberal and authoritarian) power hierarchies. Although this research is 
concerned with a rather different form of civil society engagement to the topic of this 
paper, drawing attention to (competing) moral and liberal agendas within civil society 
in this manner is in fact quite pertinent in terms of the research presented here. For 
example, civil society engagement with gender and development policy making in 
Malaysia has been framed around both a ‘market feminist’ agenda relating to women’s 
labour market roles and a socially conservative (though arguably, equally neoliberal 
compatible) moral agenda relating to women’s reproductive roles within the family. The 
analysis presented in this paper points to how Malaysian women have come to play 
important symbolic and material roles in a Malaysian modernity project currently 
preoccupied with the overriding pursuit of national economic competitiveness. The 
state’s pursuit of economic competitiveness and ‘modernity’ more broadly, has, as 
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Stivens (1998) points out, rested upon reworkings of public/private divides that reflect, 
not simply, the increased incorporation of women into the formal productive economy 
since the 1970s but also reconfiguration(s) of state-civil society relations. For example, 
competing conceptions of modern Malay womanhood exist within localised processes of 
Islamicisation of state and society that have developed alongside wider processes of 
Islamic globalisation(s). At the same time, a rising middle class oriented women’s rights 
activism that has particular relationships with globalised forms of feminism has found a 
certain level of expression within the state—albeit one in which a market feminist 
agenda and corporate voices predominate. Thus the institutionalisation of specific social 
forces within the state occurs in dynamic interaction with the emergence of globalising 
social movements centred on both Islam and feminism. These complex gendered 
dynamics are productive of a state-civil society relationship that simply cannot be 
conceptualised in terms of the adversarial conceptualisation of state-civil society that 
dominates much of the Malaysian civil society literature. 
Both Phillips (2002) and Howell (2005) suggest that feminist scholarship has 
tended to have an ambivalent relationship with the concept of civil society—not least 
because of the way in which a lot of the scholarship on civil society tends put forward a 
view of the associational word as an autonomous (and gender neutral) realm, 
analytically separate from not just the state but also the family and the household. In 
light of the analysis presented in this paper, such a neo-Tocquevillian characterisation is 
deeply problematic. For example, one of the issues that emerges out of this paper 
concerns how forms of the subordination of the domestic, socially reproductive realm 
intersects with other forms of social inequality in society and how these intersecting 
forms of inequality are reproduced within the associational world. How for example, do 
the gendered, classed and racialised practices of childcare and other forms of 
reproductive work impact on the agendas and practices of both women’s movements 
and other non-governmental organisations mobilised around deeply gendered issues 
such as marriage, the family or women’s economic participation? Or why is it that the 
voices of migrant domestic workers or informal sector workers are largely missing in 
debates on women’s economic participation?  
Civil society needs to be conceptualised as operating within the context of 
transformations in productive-socially reproductive economic structures within the 
context of broader neoliberal transitions (Bakker and Gill 2003). Notably, the state’s 
active role in subordinating class based forms of political opposition is a key component 
in the structuring of state-civil society engagement. This issue is most obvious in 
relation to the case of women’s representation on corporate boards whereby corporate 
interests have come to play an even more prominent role in state gender agendas. But 
we also see, in the case of family policy, how the state seeks to legitimate a particular 
policy direction through engagement with religious and ethnic based organisations thus 
shoring up the operation of a political system in which a politics of ethnicity performs 
an important role in maintaining the political hegemony of the ruling party (Nair 2007).  
Finally, it is important to point out that the arguments articulated in this paper 
are not meant to suggest that there is no scope for forms of civil society activism that 
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seek to challenge the market logic of the current government’s competitiveness agenda. 
Many Malaysian NGOs are engaged in activities that seek to challenge and ameliorate 
some of the ways in which the drive for economic competitiveness is accompanied by 
gendered and racialised processes and structures of economic marginalisation (for 
example, elsewhere (Elias 2010) I explore the activities of Malaysian pro-migrant 
worker NGOs). These struggles are important, but they are only part of the picture and 
we need to avoid characterisations of civil society solely as a space that can be 
simplistically equated with progressive and/or democratic politics. As the arguments 
articulated in this paper demonstrate, consent for the neoliberal compatible gender and 
competitiveness agenda in Malaysia takes shape within the context of state 
engagements with a civil society divided around intersecting issues of class, ethnicity 
and religion. In this context, conservative religious values associated with Malaysia’s 
new middle classes and corporate-aligned business interests win out.  
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1 The NEP was launched in 1970 and was designed, through the imposition of various quotas, as 
an affirmative action strategy to raise the status of the Malay (or bumpiputera) population. As a 
result of its colonial past, Malaysia is a multi ethnic country. In 2010, of the three main ethnic 
groups Malays made up 60.3% of the total population, Chinese 22.9%, and Indians 6.8%. 
2 This issue was raised in an interview with officials from the National Institute of Human 
Development, Ministry of Human Resources (and a member of Permandu’s Human Capital SRI 
Lab), personal interview, 21st February 2012. However, the majority of the current work being 
undertaken on women’s labour force participation involves the Ministry for Women Family and 
Community Development who have recently started work with UNDP Malaysia on a broad 
research project looked at how best to increase women’s labour force participation. Personal 
interview with Principal Assistant Secretary, Planning and Research Unit, Policy Division, 
Ministry of Women, Family and Community Development. Putrajaya, 27th February 2012. 
3 These are issues that have had considerable media attention and were also all raised in 
interviews with members of the Social Services section of the state’s Economic Planning Unit, 
Putrajaya 11th November 2011 
4 Secular organisations are involved but are few and far between. One such organisation is 
Yayasan Strategik Social (YSS) the social development wing of the Malaysian Indian Congress 
(part of the ruling Barisan Nasional coalition). 
5 This discussion draws upon personal interviews conducted with the head of Wanita ISMA and 
the director of the organisation’s konvensyen Keluarga, Petailing Jaya, 10th February 2012. 
6 It should be noted that all Muslim couples in Malaysia are required to undertake a pre-marital 
training course administered by JAKIM the government’s Islamic department as part of the 
marriage registration process. 
7 Personal interview with the head of Wanita ISMA, Petailing Jaya, 10th February 2012. 
8 Personal interview with the head of Wanita ISMA, Petailing Jaya, 10th February 2012. 
 23 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
9 Personal interview with Empower director Maria Chin Abdullah, Petailing Jaya, 20th February 
2011 
10 Personal interview with Marina Mahathir, Kuala Lumpur 9th November 2011 
11 Personal interview with Senior Assistant Director NIEW, Kuala Lumpur, 31st October 2011 
12 Personal interview with Chief Executive Officer, Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group, 
Kuala Lumpur 28th February 2012 
13 This issue was raised by the Chief Executive Officer, Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group, 
Kuala Lumpur, personal interview 28th February 2012. At the February 2012 Women in 
Leadership Forum Asia that I attended in Kuala Lumpur, prominent representatives from the 
Malaysian state and business community including NIEW director Rafiah Salam, the director of 
the Malaysian Alliance of Corporate Directors, the chairman of the Malaysian Institute of 
Management and prominent Malaysian business women such as Raja Teh Maimunah the MD 
and CEO of Hong Leong Islamic Bank and the fund manager Shireen Ann Zaharah Muhideen also 
presented this issue in a similar manner (in relation to issues of both profitability and corporate 
governance as well as the role that women board members can play in promoting the interests 
of women further down the corporate ladder). 
14 The WCI were unable to field a suitable candidate at the 2008 election and thus created the 
‘everywoman’ character of Mak Bedah in order to highlight issues affecting women in Malaysia 
that were overlooked in mainstream political debate. See Lee (2011). 
15 The Wanita Suara Perubahan protests took place on 18th March 2012 and involved many of 
the same women activists who had been involved in wider Bersih campaigns for clean 
government. 
